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Beyond rubber prices: negotiating the
Great Depression in Singapore
Loh Kah Seng
Abstract: This paper looks at life in Singapore during the Great
Depression in the early 1930s from the perspectives of the ordinary
people who lived through it. Besides discussing the slump’s impact
on businesses, wages and employment, it examines how effectively
people responded to the crisis. Their distress was alleviated by
immigration controls and a fall in the cost of living at the societal
level, and also by mutual help, based on family and kinship ties, at
the individual level. It appears that life for many people was not as
difficult as might be supposed. The quality of life, reflected in
indices such as mortality and crime, seemed generally satisfactory
after 1930, while the island was also spared serious social and
political upheaval.
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Recent scholarship on the early 1930s Great Depression in South East
Asia suggests that the slump caused ‘only a relatively modest deterior-
ation in material conditions’.1 The research, while mostly on rural areas,
has also provided a better understanding of the dynamics functioning
within the region’s cities. Of Manila, Daniel Doeppers painted a
variegated picture of employees in various economic sectors faring
differently during the crisis, with the bureaucratic class enjoying ‘an
explosion’ in purchasing power.2 Likewise, John Ingleson maintained
that ‘many, if not most, urban Indonesians coped with the depression
far better than has often been surmised’, for example, by accepting
lower paying jobs.3 In contrast, Gregg Huff studied Singapore’s
1 Brown, I. (1997), Economic Change in Southeast Asia, c.1830–1980, Oxford
University Press, Kuala Lumpur, pp 222–223.
2 Doeppers, D. F. (1991), ‘Metropolitan Manila in the Great Depression: crisis for
whom?’ Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 50, No 3, pp 511–535.
3 Ingleson, J. (1988), ‘Urban Java during the Depression’, Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies, Vol 19, No 2, pp 292–309.
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experience using the concept of ‘entitlements’, factors protecting one
from economic shocks. Huff argued that most people in Singapore
suffered because they lacked entitlements, having few savings or little
access to land, which would have allowed them to take up subsistence
farming and escape the scourge of unemployment. Only the farmers on
the peninsula, he concluded, were shielded from the slump.4
The recent scholarship is economic in nature and underpinned by
statistics, with a fundamental concern with the connections between
trade, commodity prices, business and industry, and employment and
work. Beyond this, the research does not venture much further. People
are discussed as units of labour, with their experiences tied to their
occupations. In Singapore’s case, this is reinforced by a tendency to
frame its history within ‘a Whiggish telos of economic development,
progress, modernity, and modernisation since 1819’.5 Mainstream
Singapore history, in concentrating on the plunge in rubber and tin prices
during the Depression, has concluded that it brought ‘serious hardship
to all the people, particularly those of the lower classes’,6 and ‘was a
time of great hardship’.7
This paper seeks to provide a more balanced view of life in Singa-
pore during the Depression by combining the economic paradigm with
a social framework. It will examine the reaction of the British
administration to the slump and the adjustments in the cost of living,
both of which had an ameliorative effect on the distress. The final part
of the essay, however, deals with people’s responses to the crisis and is
a history from below, reconstructed from non-official sources such as
oral history interviews, letters to the press, biographies, and coroners’
inquests. The paper contends that many, if not most, people negotiated
the Depression’s worst effects through mutual help at the individual
level, usually from family members, kinsmen and friends. This is not a
paradigm of economic development but of the people’s agency, grounded
4 Huff, W. G. (2001), ‘Entitlements, destitution and emigration in the 1930s Singa-
pore Great Depression’, Economic History Review, Vol 54, No 3, pp 290–323.
5 Wee, C. J. W.-L. (2003), ‘Our island story: economic development and the national
narrative in Singapore’, in Abu Talib Ahmad and Tan Liok Ee, eds, New Terrains in
Southeast Asian History, Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, and Singapore Univer-
sity Press, Singapore, p 141.
6 Chui Kwei-chiang (1991), ‘Political attitudes and organisations, c.1900–1941’, in
Ernest Chew and Edwin Lee, eds, A History of Singapore, Oxford University Press,
Singapore, p 88.
7 Turnbull, C. M. (1989), A History of Singapore, 1819–1988, 2 ed, Oxford University
Press, Singapore, p 135.
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in social ties. Life during the Depression was shaped by people’s
survival strategies as much as by official policy and macroeconomic
developments. They were part of the island’s strong tradition of
mutual help based on kinship ties and its transition to a society of
settlers. Mutual help and family bonds represent the people’s real
entitlements.8
Before the slump: a city built on linkages
An economic study of colonial Singapore will point to its openness to
the global economy as the source of its growth and its vulnerability.
Whether as an ‘entrepot’ serving the east–west trade,9 or as a ‘vent’ for
surplus staples from Malaya and the Dutch East Indies,10 Singapore’s
economic health was reliant on the prices of the commodities imported,
stored, in some cases processed, and redistributed in its trade. By the
1920s, four categories of staples dominated Singapore’s trade: most
importantly rubber, plus tin, petroleum and tropical produce. A boom
in the demand for durable consumer goods such as automobiles in the
West after the First World War fuelled the production of these staples
in South East Asia.
While Singapore’s economy was buoyant in the 1920s after a brief
recession from 1920–22, this was due to its international focus. The
island had a much weaker manufacturing sector, dealing largely in
rubber products and canned pineapple – the enterprise of Chinese
capitalists diversifying their investments in the export trade. Manufac-
turing was connected to international trade: many businesses in both
sectors had the same owners, who produced simple manufactures out
of the primary commodities they handled in the export trade.
Pineapple, for instance, was grown as a ‘catch crop’ on many Chinese
rubber plantations.11 Diversification was a hallmark of Chinese entre-
preneurship, but it came at a price, for it was facilitated by the importance
the Chinese attached to kinship ties. Tan Kah Kee, the most prominent
businessman in the 1920s, was not exceptional in liberally taking
8 I am grateful to Gregg Huff for suggesting the link between entitlements and mutual
help.
9 See Wong Lin Ken (1978), ‘Singapore: its growth as an entrepot port, 1819–1941’,
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol 9, No 1, March.
10 Huff, W. G. (1994), The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in
the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 14–15.
11 Report of the Pineapple Conference (1931), Straits Settlements, Singapore, pp 4–5.
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unsecured short-term loans from banks owned by fellow Hokkiens.
Chinese capitalists used their loans to expand and diversify their enter-
prises, speculate in currencies and commodities or, in the case of Tan,
finance charitable works in Singapore and China, with little regard for
financial liquidity. Among the Chinese, business dealing based on kin-
ship ties was unquestioned. As a banker observed, ‘[i]n the old days, a
Chinese businessman’s word was his bond’.12 Chinese traders import-
ing wet rubber and tropical produce used a credit system also based on
kinship ties; their kinsmen, as outport dealers in the Dutch East Indies,
advanced provisions to indigenous producers of the commodities, which
upon delivery they would transfer to Singapore.13
The local economy also consisted of service industries lubricating
the entrepot trade, including Chinese banks and engineering firms
servicing rubber estates, tin mines in Malaya and shipbuilding and
repair. There was also a wide range of occupations supporting the
international economy: labourers (14% of the active workforce in 1931)
such as dock workers, lightermen and general coolies, clerks (7%),
transport workers such as rickshaw pullers (4%) and hawkers (8%)
who served these employment groups.14 According to the 1931
Malayan census, the international economy employed only 14% of the
active workforce (a figure probably lowered by the Depression), but it
had an important bearing on the lives of the remaining majority.15 The
local economy, in which work was characterized by underemployment,
was an important shield against destitution, where the jobless could
seek temporary or informal work. Nevertheless, by itself the
protection was insufficient as, to varying degrees, business and
employment in the local economy were affected by the flow and ebb of
the international economy.
Life in Singapore, however, was determined by its society as much
as by the economy. Two elements of the society, although connected to
the economy, had developed independently of it. The first, as illus-
trated in their business networks, was the importance of kinship to the
Chinese. Their attachment to ties based on locality (in China), surname
12 Yap Pheng Geck (1982), Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier: The Reminiscences of
Dr. Yap Pheng Geck, Times Books International, Singapore, p 38.
13 Straits Settlements Trade Commission 1933–1934 [hereafter SSTC] (1934), Vol 1,
Government Printing Office, Singapore, p 41.
14 Compiled from Vlieland, C. A. (1932), A Report of the 1931 Census and on Certain
Problems of Vital Statistics, Crown Agents for the Colonies, London, pp 252–255.
15 Ibid, pp 246–247.
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and kinship led different bangs or dialect-speaking groups among the
Chinese to dominate various sectors of the economy and employment.
The Malay and Indian minorities were similarly prominent in other
occupations. Kinship ties established among the Chinese, Indian and
Malay migrants a strong tradition of mutual help in response to the
challenge of making a living in a foreign place under an alien adminis-
tration. These ties explained how, in Chinese banks, ‘in many cases the
manager was a son of the chief director, the cashier the son-in-law, the
assistant manager the nephew’.16 Chinese businessmen established
voluntary institutions to assist (and control) their poorer kinsmen, which
provided ‘shelters, charity, medical care...and educational amenities to
members and families’.17 Working-class Chinese utilized mutual help
on a smaller scale: new arrivals, or sinkehs, typically came to join a
family member or fellow villager in a chain of migration.18 Chew Choo
Keng, who arrived in Singapore penniless, recalled that ‘[a]s soon as I
stepped out of the Immigration Office, I was received and taken away
by a relative to the first floor of a house in Jalan Besar which he rented’.
The relative, an uncle from his home village, was Tan Kah Kee’s nephew,
whose recommendation found Chew work in Tan’s biscuit factory.19
The second element was the emergence of the nuclear family in the
early twentieth century. Pre-Depression Singapore stood on the
threshold of an important societal transition. Since the late nineteenth
century, Chinese sojourners who were successful in business had been
settling down instead of returning to their ancestral villages;20 most
locally-born Chinese in Malaya were ‘traders or shopkeepers, and not
labourers or agriculturists’.21 By the 1930s, local settlement and
marriage had permeated wider sections of Singapore’s population. In
1931, due to a more balanced sex ratio among the Chinese and Malays,
39% of the total population and 36% of its Chinese population were
locally born. Seven out of 10 people were between 15 and 54 years of
16 Yap, supra note 12, at p 27.
17 Yong Ching Fatt (1977), ‘Pang, Pang organisations and leadership in the Chinese
community of Singapore during the 1930s’, Journal of South Seas Society, Vol 32,
pp 49–50.
18 Wang Gungwu (2000), The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest
for Autonomy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 57–58.
19 Chan Kwok Bun and Claire Chiang See Ngoh (1994), Stepping Out: The Making of
Chinese Entrepreneurs, Prentice Hall, Singapore, pp 90–92.
20 Wang Gungwu (1991), ‘The Chinese as immigrants and settlers: Singapore’, China
and the Chinese Overseas, Times Academic Press, Singapore, pp 175–176.
21 Vlieland, supra note 14, at p 70.
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age, indicating a healthy proportion of people of working age. The
young dependency burden (children under 15) was considerably heavy
(at 26%) and the old dependency burden (people aged 55 and over)
relatively light (at 4%).22 These figures suggest that many families had
at least some members of working age, which was crucial during the
slump. Ties between kinsmen and between family members, and the
financial and emotional support they lent, could ensure that most
people did not have to mediate economic shocks alone.
After Wall Street: an end to the millionaire rubber kings
As is well known, the Depression was precipitated by a number of
massive crashes on the Wall Street Stock Exchange in October 1929.
The most serious of these, on ‘Black Tuesday’, 29 October, slashed the
value of stocks by 40%. The shocks reduced the demand for durable
consumer goods in the USA, and soon generally in the West. As
business investment in the West contracted and excess stocks of raw
materials piled up in American warehouses, commodity prices in South
East Asia collapsed. The League of Nations report on the slump
observed that because ‘the prices of raw materials have dropped more
rapidly than those of manufactured products’,23 countries producing
the former suffered more than manufacturing countries.24 The crisis
struck Singapore before the end of 1929 and persisted over the next
three years. As Table 1 shows, the value of Singapore’s trade fell
heavily until in 1933 it was only 44% of the 1929 figure.
The Depression was prolonged by continuing overproduction of the
primary commodities. Both European estates, to keep unit costs low,
and indigenous smallholders, to sustain their incomes against falling
prices, persisted in producing rubber beyond the demand.25 Table 2
shows that the culling of rubber production lagged behind the drop in
prices: between 1929 and 1932, rubber prices in Singapore slumped by
80%, but the volume of exports, an indicator of production, dropped
by only 27%. At the lowest price of 4.95 cents per pound in June 1932,
it was more expensive to produce than to buy rubber.
22 Vlieland, supra note 14, at pp 232–233.
23 League of Nations (1931), The Course and Phases of the World Economic Depres-
sion, General Secretariat of the League of Nations, p 283.
24 Ibid, pp 232–233.
25 Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1930), ‘The rubber plantation industry’, PRO CO 825/8/6,
18/09/1930; Drabble, J. H. (1991), Malayan Rubber: The Interwar Years, Macmillan,
London, pp 49–50.
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Table 1. Value of Singapore’s foreign trade, 1929–35 ($m).
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Imports  655 528 334 287 262 342 344
Exports  517 406 268 243 251 326 330
Total 1,171 934 602 530 513 668 674
Source: compiled from Straits Settlements Annual Report (SSAR) 1929–1935.
Table 2. Rubber prices and exports in Singapore, 1929–35.
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Price (cents/pound) 34.45 19.00 9.78 7.01 10.21 20.63 20.25
Volume of exports (000 tons) 253.9 233.8 220.5 184.3 230.4 316.0 258.6
Percentage price change –5.7 –44.8 –48.5 –28.3 +45.6 +102.1 –1.8
Percentage volume change +26.1 –7.9 –5.7 –16.4 +25.0 +37.2 –18.2
Source: compiled from SSAR, 1929–35.
A small recovery in prices only served to stimulate production. In
late 1933, the prospect for an international rubber restriction treaty
lifted prices slightly, but caused a surge in production in the Dutch
East Indies and Malaya.26 The cycle of overproduction and plummet-
ing prices was arrested only in May 1934, with the signing of the
International Rubber Restriction Agreement, which placed quotas on
both countries from 1 June. Similarly, the prices of tin, petroleum and
tropical produce stabilized only when the state imposed restrictions on
production or when, belatedly, low prices forced indigenous producers
to turn to subsistence agriculture. Tin prices fluctuated the least, owing
to the restriction of production from March 1931 by the Tin Control
Scheme. But the production of other exports was not restricted. The
value of petroleum fell by 20%, while the volume of exports from
Singapore rose by 7% between 1929 and 1933. Likewise, the average
value of 16 items of tropical produce fell by 61%, while their export
volume increased by 13% between 1927 and 1934. Only in 1933 did
production of these commodities fall sufficiently to revive prices. That
year, Governor Cecil Clementi stated hopefully that ‘the worst is now
over, so far as we are concerned, and I pray that we may soon be once
more in smooth waters’,27 although the following years saw only
26 Drabble, supra note 25, at p 20.
27 Governor’s Address to the Legislative Council (1933), Straits Settlements Legisla-
tive Council Proceedings 1933 (hereafter SSLCP), p B122.
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modest growth, and for the rest of the decade, Singapore never regained
its former prosperity.
The slump had a severe, wide-ranging impact on business and
employment in Singapore. For many businessmen, it brought a rude
awakening to the disregard for liquidity and the risks of business deal-
ing based on kinship ties. Owing to the plunge in commodity prices,
‘most of the millionaire rubber kings were wiped out’,28 but the effects
spread wider. The number of small rubber estates employing less than
a hundred labourers fell from 93 in 1929 to 37 in 1932.29 The greatest
business failure was Tan Kah Kee & Company. Tan later described the
liquidity crisis that hit him ‘like a person running for his life from a
robber finding himself suddenly in the presence of a tiger’.30 His
rubber goods could not compete with cheap Japanese and Hong Kong
imports. With debts of more than $10 million owed to Chinese and
British banks, Tan was pressed into converting his enterprise into a
private limited company run by a board of directors appointed by the
banks. The protection for Empire goods following the Ottawa
Conference in May 1932 gave his rubber shoes a competitive edge over
Japanese products. But Tan found his efforts to expand his rubber
manufacturing business blocked by the directors. The British would
tolerate no competition for their home rubber shoe manufacturers; Tan
was told by a Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank manager that ‘[w]e will
not permit any foreigners to encroach on our British interests’.31 Tan
Kah Kee & Company was voluntarily liquidated in April 1934.
The liquidity crisis also ruined businesses in other branches of the
international economy. Most of the bankrupts during the slump years,
whose number rose from 634 in 1929 to 1,004 in 1932, were Chinese
traders or retrenched clerks.32 David Ng recalled that his father, who
advanced goods on credit to his clients in Sarawak, was unable to
collect payment to service his bank loans and had to wind up his
28 Macbeth, M. (2003), Quiet Achiever: The Life and Times of Tan Sri Dr. Tan Chin
Tuan, Times Editions, Singapore, p 23.
29 Labour Department (1929–1933), Straits Settlements Annual Departmental Reports
(hereafter SSADR).
30 Tan Kah Kee (1994), The Memoirs of Tan Kah Kee, edited and translated with notes
by A.H.C. Ward, Raymond W. Chu & Janet Salaff, Singapore University Press,
Singapore, p 334.
31 Ibid, pp 332–333.
32 Bankruptcy Department, SSADR, 1929–1934.
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business.33 Indian businessmen like Rajabali Jumabhoy suffered heavy
losses from their speculation on the guilder; Jumabhoy had to close
down overseas branches of his company and came to regard cards and
speculation as the ‘two vices of modern society and the business world’.34
On the pineapple-canning industry, the Pineapple Conference surmised
that ‘of the remaining 12 factories [in Singapore, Johore and Selangor
in 1931], 5 are not operating owing to the fact that the proprietors have
become financially embarrassed as a result of the general slump
condition at present prevailing which have affected their financial
interests in other directions’.35 A pineapple agriculturist recalled that
many cultivators turned to planting vegetables, rearing poultry or
salaried work.36
The contraction of the international economy had knock-on effects
on businesses in the local economy offering goods and services that
were demand-elastic. Insurance companies were hurt by their clients
cutting policies out of their expenditure.37 The collapse of the property
market reduced work for lawyers, with some charging only $5 for 10
notices of action.38 Faced with more people pledging articles for cash
than redeeming them, pawnshops were forced to sell expired pledges
at unprofitable prices.39 Goldsmiths and jewellers in Malaya complained
that ‘most of the women were willing to sell their bijoutry, but exceed-
ingly few would buy any’.40 Even enterprises that were more
demand-stable were not spared. Coffee shops faced increased competi-
tion as people retrenched from their jobs ventured into the business.41
Victor Seah recalled that his parents’ sundries shop, which sold
provisions on credit, went bust because the customers – rubber
tappers, farmers and coolies whose incomes had been reduced – were
unable to pay.42 But for other small businesses with low overheads, the
slump produced only a minor ebb in their fortunes. Fidahusein Tyebally,
33 Ng, D. (1986), Oral History Interview (hereafter OHI), 20/05/1986, Oral History
Centre, National Archives of Singapore, pp 12–13. All oral history interviews used
in this paper are from the Oral History Centre.
34 Rajabali Jumabhoy (1990), Multiracial Singapore: On to the Nineties, Chopmen
Publishers, Singapore, pp 41–44.
35 Report of the Pineapple Conference (1931), Straits Settlements, Singapore, p 10.
36 Ong Koh Bee, OHI, 16/06/1981, pp 40–41, 290.
37 Ng Aik Huan, OHI, 09/11/1983.
38 Malaya Tribune (MT), 08/10/1932, p 4.
39 MT, 02/05/1930, p 3.
40 Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs January 1935 (hereafter MRCA), p 78.
41 SSTC 1933–1934, Vol 1, p 184.
42 Victor Seah Tiong Hin (2002), A Life Worth Reliving, T.H. Seah, Singapore, p 11.
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a modest exporter of rattan to India, remembered that ‘[m]y business
was a little affected but not much’ and grew thereafter.43 Likewise,
Kheng Hoe, which sold imported cement, nails, ropes and copper plates
locally and to Muar and Malacca, did not have many competitors and
expanded from 1933. As one of the firm’s partners explained, ‘I did not
experience any fluctuation in the volume of my business as the goods
sold were mostly required by the local people’.44
Struggling employers substantially reduced wages, work and even-
tually employment, which affected various ethnic, employment and
age groups. The official records contain only statistics on the wages of
Indian rubber estate workers, but these could be used as a de facto
standard wage for Chinese and Javanese labourers, who were thought
to be paid ‘about the same as the rates for Indians’.45 Given the
importance of rubber, it is also plausible that ‘wages in the rubber
industry set the standard for Indian and Javanese wages in all other
industries’.46 In October 1930, the government in Malaya reduced the
standard wage by 20% to 40 and 30 cents for Indian male and female
estate workers respectively to ward off retrenchment for an estimated
40,000 out of 280,000 coolies.47 Wage cuts also affected ‘directors,
visiting agents, medical officers, managers and assistant managers’ and
‘subordinates, such as clerks, conductors and dressers, employed on
estates’.48 Table 3 shows that between 1930 and 1933, wages for Indian
estate workers fell by 39% for males and 40% for females. The wages
of Indian labourers employed by the government and other employers
fell less, by 21% and 11% respectively between 1929 and 1932.
Retrenchment, unavoidable when the slump persisted, struck estate
workers and, in the local economy, labourers, skilled workers and clerks.
The number of Indian rubber tappers fell from 4,454 in 1929 to 483 in
1933, as most large companies retrenched heavily (see Table 4).
Clerks were among the first to suffer the retrenchment axe, as their work
could be absorbed by others. Those retained often had to work overtime
without pay or perform the work of ‘three men’,49 although admittedly the
workload in many firms and public offices also fell.50
43 Fidahusein Tyebally, OHI, 01/08/1982, pp 19–22.
44 Yap Ee Chian, OHI, 13/08/1980, pp 36–47.
45 Labour Department, SSADR 1929, p 190.
46 Labour Department, SSADR 1938, p 39.
47 SSLCP 1930, p B93.
48 PRO CO 273/573, 5774/1930, 02/10/1930.
49 MT, 13/03/1934, p 14.
50 Low Cheng Gin, OHI, 03/06/1983, p 187.
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Table 3. Wages of Indian labourers in Singapore, 1929–35 (cents per day).
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Male estate workers 50–65* 40–50 35–40 25–40 28–40 30–55 35–40
Female estate workers 45–50 35–45 32–35 20–30 24–30 28–35 32
Government employees 55–70 58–70 47–64 47–55 40–96 40–96 40–95
Miscellaneous employees 60–90 60–80 50–85 50–80 50–80 50–80 55–108
* The lower figure denotes wages for morning work.
Source: compiled from Labour Department, SSADR, 1929–35.
Table 4. Number of labourers employed in Singapore by firm, 1929–33.
Industry Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Rubber estates
Bukit Sembawang Rubber Co 1,108 1,120 617 573 481
Singapore United Rubber Plantations 344 448 247 266 308
Yunnan Estate 180 163 131 <100* <100
Mercantile firms
Alexandra Brick Works 373 348 187 167 152
Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd 956 1,085 1,130 869 699
East Asiatic Co Ltd 240 377 <100 <100 274
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co Ltd 153 125 177 163 161
Lee Rubber Works 265 312 250 640 640
Oriental Telephone & Electric Co Ltd 245 282 224 193 157
Pulau Brani Smelting Works 384 367 496 472 450
Sin Seng Moh Rubber Factory 285 198 215 <100 <100
Singapore Rubber Works 322 245 354 304 353
Singapore Slipway & Engineering Co 201 206 147 164 133
Sir John Jackson  – 1,489 1,924 2,339 2,684
Tamil Labour Co 1,563 1,820 1,709 1,511 1,356
Tan Kah Kee & Co 4,088 3,626 3,947 2,899 4,108
Tanjong Pagar Labour Syndicate 1,668 1,972 1,654 2,005 1,662
United Engineers Ltd 2,183 2,002 496 420 354
* <100 could mean that the firm had wound up.
Source: compiled from Labour Department, SSADR, 1929–33.
The distress struck ‘[v]ery many people of a good social class,
Europeans and Asiatics’.51 Between 1929 and 1932, among estate
workers, 57% of the Javanese (a group the British classified as ‘Malays’)
were jobless, compared with 45% among the Chinese and 75% among
Indians. In mercantile firms, unemployment affected 14% of Chinese
labourers between 1929 and 1931, and 23% of Indians and 39% of the
51 MT, 06/05/1930, p 8.
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Javanese between 1929 and 1932.52 Out-of-work European rubber
planters had difficulty finding new work,53 while the highly-paid
European assistant became ‘an expensive luxury’ in commercial firms.54
Scenes of ‘educated Europeans and Eurasians, shabbily dressed . . .
hanging around eating-houses and coffee-shops, and walking about the
streets for unemployment and unable to find it’ were common.55 Many
Eurasians, typically clerks used to a high standard of living, suffered
from dismissals in that occupation.56
The slump affected some social and age groups more than others. As
Chinese employers typically hired their kinsmen, employees ‘not closely
related to the management would be the first to receive notices of
termination’.57 Those with difficulty finding work were sinkehs with
few local contacts, the unskilled, weak-bodied or elderly. An elderly
applicant for an advertised position complained of being passed over
due to his age,58 while some firms released long-serving senior
employees on large salaries to cut costs.59 Conversely, school-leavers
lacking work experience found employment elusive, such as Tay Meng
Hock, who had an accounting degree but failed to find a permanent job
for nearly a year.60 Another young man, freshly graduated from school,
had no luck finding clerical work and was the family’s sole
breadwinner; his father had passed away and his mother depended on
the Widows’ and Orphans’ Fund to support a family with 10 children.61
Working women often suffered more than men: female factory
workers now earned less because they were not employed after 5 pm.62
Government employees fared better. The administration’s wage cuts
and economy measures came much later than in the private sector:
Temporary Allowances, some 10–20% of the gross income, were
removed only in January 1932. As late as the end of 1931, a proposal
for a 10% wage reduction for municipal employees was defeated.
Systematic retrenchment occurred only in September 1932, when the
52 Compiled from Labour Department, SSADR, 1929–1935.
53 MT, 19/08/1930, p 8.
54 MT, 24/08/1934, p 10.
55 MT, 02/10/1930, p 11.
56 MT, 12/01/1932, p 8.
57 Lai Kai Joo, OHI, 09/04/1981, p 40.
58 MT, 20/02/1933, p 2.
59 Somasundram, S. C., OHI, 15/03/1982, pp 133–134.
60 Tay Meng Hock, OHI, 28/08/1984.
61 MT, 19/02/1932, p 5.
62 MRCA August 1932, pp 23–26.
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government accepted recommendations by the Straits Settlements
Retrenchment Committee for a 13% cut in personal emoluments, a 10%
cut in the pay of senior officers, a freeze in recruitment, and the sus-
pension of miscellaneous allowances. In November, the Municipality
implemented a 10% salary cut, reductions in allowances and retrench-
ments in several departments. The government downsized its pool of
Indian labourers from 15,077 in 1929 to 9,105 in 1934. Still the
measures did not hit as hard as in the private sector. Wages for
municipal coolies, reduced from 58 cents to 50 cents in 1932, remained
‘appreciably higher than those paid elsewhere in the town’.63 Retrench-
ment did not affect all public employees equally. The Police Department,
claiming the importance of its work, successfully resisted ‘[d]rastic
reductions’ to its force.64 According to Soh Wah Seng, a surveyor–
draughtsman with the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT), which was
responsible for urban development, the Trust escaped retrenchment
because it had a small staff and low overheads. Soh remembered some
laid off in other departments receiving six months’ salary in
compensation, but they were recalled when the economy improved
after three months, gaining an additional three months’ pay!65 How-
ever, as Gregg Huff pointed out, government employees – only 8% of
the active workforce in 1931 – were too few to raise the general
standard of living.66
The unemployment crisis was worsened by the heavy retrenchment
of Chinese tin-miners in Malaya. Singapore, as the port of entry and
exit for Chinese migrants, experienced an ‘invasion of unemployed
persons from other parts of the Peninsula, no doubt hoping to find work
in this wonderful city or, if they cannot get work, perhaps to get away
by sea’ (Indian emigrants went to Penang).67 The Tin Control Scheme,
which reduced work for miners after March 1931, increased the number
of homeless sleeping out at night from 3,000 to 5,000 between March
and August 1931.68 In early 1930, noticeably more beggars were
harassing pedestrians,69 many of them not professional beggars and
decrepits, but young and able-bodied.70
63 Singapore Municipality Administration Report 1932, (hereafter SMAR), p 13-F.
64
‘Comments by the Straits Settlements Government on the Report of the Straits Set-
tlements Retrenchment Committee’, February 1933, SSLCP 1933, pp C57, C77-78.
65 Soh Wah Seng, OHI, 22/08/1983.
66 Huff, supra note 4, at p 311.
67 SSLCP 1930, p B130.
68 SSLCP 1931, p 97.
69 MT, 01/05/1930, p 11.
70 MT, 17/05/1930, p 11.
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Remarkable evidence to the contrary
One might have expected the hardship to be reflected in a number of
indices on the quality of life, for instance, an increase in mortality,
crime and social unrest. In the first full year of the Depression, there
were signs that the distress was building. As Tables 5 and 6 show, the
death rate in 1930 climbed from 25.8 to 27.6 per thousand, with
increases in the major categories of disease (pneumonia and
bronchitis, tuberculosis, malaria, diarrhoea and enteritis, beriberi and
dysentery). This the authorities attributed to lower dietary standards
and resistance to disease caused by the slump,71 and ‘the congregation
of out of work Chinese coolies from all over Malaya in Singapore’.72
Cases of non-seizable crime (minor punishable offences such as street
indiscipline) rose from 67,670 to 72,649, and of seizable crime (more
serious offences such as murder and robbery) from 4,598 to 5,101 (see
Table 7). The hardship also spurred some occupational groups and
workers into collective action. In December 1929, a large number of
hawkers gathered at the Chinese Protectorate to protest at the police
crackdown on itinerant hawkers.73 Two strikes occurred in August 1930:
150 of Tan Kah Kee’s employees against a 10% cut in wages,74 and
more than 3,000 Indian labourers at the Singapore Naval Base against
the reduction of daily wages from 80 cents to 70 cents and poor
conditions of work.75
However, the following two years, the worst period of the trade
recession, saw the situation improve, while it deteriorated somewhat
in 1934–35 when the economy was recovering. Between 1931 and 1935,
it seems that mortality, crime and social unrest were affected less by
the Depression than by factors internal to the field, with the austere
conditions even having a beneficial effect in some cases. The mortality
rate fell in 1931, which the government noted as ‘remarkable’.76
Indeed, the 1932 figure was the lowest in Singapore’s history to that
period. But the economy’s recovery in 1934–35 brought non-immune
immigrants to Singapore, resulting in a fresh cycle of infection and
71 Health Department, SMAR 1930, p 57-D.
72 SSAR 1930, Vol 9 (Archive Editions Limited, 1998), p 1.
73 Yeo Lian Bee, K. (1989), ‘Hawkers and the state in colonial Singapore: mid-
nineteenth century to 1939’, MA thesis, Department of History, Monash University,
pp 140–144.
74 MT, 16/08/1930, p 9.
75 MT, 19/08/1930, p 9.
76 Medical Report, SSADR 1931, p 1010.
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Table 5. Death rate (per thousand) in Singapore, 1929–35.
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
25.84 27.62 24.20 20.40 22.51 24.07 24.32
Source: compiled from Registration of Births and Deaths, SSADR, 1929–1935.
Table 6. Deaths by disease in Singapore municipality, 1929–35.
Disease 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Pneumonia & bronchitis 2,033 2,091 1,881 1,539 1,644 1,632 1,934
Tuberculosis 1,500 1,622 1,377 1,088 1,189 1,253 1,312
Malaria 1,080 1,403 551 463 366 413 814
Diarrhoea & enteritis 830 969 782 684 656 699 718
Beriberi 701 818 651 509 434 538 642
Dysentery 448 531 432 382 325 286 261
Source: compiled from Health Department, SMAR, 1929–1935.
Table 7. Reports of crime in Singapore, 1929–35.
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Non-seizable crime 67,670 72,649 61,023 60,115 56,876 72,657 73,681
Seizable crime 4,598 5,101 4,996 4,905 3,829 3,307 3,725
Source: compiled from Organisation and the Administration of the Straits Settlements
Police, SSADR, 1929–1935.
increases in malaria deaths.77 Deaths from beriberi were at their lowest
during the trough of the slump but rose in 1934, because ‘the enforced
consumption of home grown produce during times of economic stress
ousts the more expensive highly polished rice with the resulting benefit to
health’.78 Similarly, cases of non-seizable and seizable crime fell after
1930. The police surmised that while ‘prolonged stress, poverty and
temptation, will be reflected in the criminal statistics of a country not
only as regards offences against property but also offences against the
person’, ‘[l]ittle or no confirmation of this theory is to be found’.79 The
hardship reduced some types of crime, such as gambling (with cases
prosecuted and the amount of fines falling in 1930 and 1931) and
77 Medical Report, SSADR 1934, p 997; SSADR 1935, p 848.
78 Medical Report, SSADR 1935, p 850.
79 Organisation and the Administration of the Straits Settlements Police, SSADR 1933,
p 496.
20 South East Asia Research
extortion.80 The police observed that ‘the disappearance of much
valuable and domestic property during the slump had reduced the amount
of valuable loot available for the robber and thief’.81 The slump also
curtailed the influence of Chinese secret societies and gangs, since
‘[p]rostitutes and others who pay “protection money” more and more
frequently find courage to report their troubles to the Police’.82
No serious social unrest erupted in Singapore. The protests of the
hawkers, Tan Kah Kee’s employees and the Naval Base labourers were
peacefully resolved. With troublesome workers easily replaceable, there
were few strikes between 1929 and 1934. The Malayan Communist
Party (MCP) failed to exploit the unemployment situation, largely
because of internal disorganization and the careful surveillance and
censorship of the Special Branch.83 But the Depression also reduced
the MCP’s membership and voluntary subscriptions,84 with the effect
that, as the government reported in 1933, ‘the general condition of the
communist movement in the Colony has never been so low’.85 Most
workers endured low wages during the Depression as ‘inevitable
exigencies of the time’, and only with the economy’s improvement from
1934 did workers begin to demand higher pay.86 In March 1934,
Chinese engineers obtained a wage rise through the Chinese Engineer-
ing Guild,87 barbers in 50 shops successfully demanded to receive full
tips in October,88 while rickshawmen struck in February 1935 against
the restoration of charges for rickshaw hire, which were waived during
the slump.
Removing the unemployables and ‘HCL’
Singapore’s ability to avoid a calamity was partly due to two develop-
ments at the societal level that ameliorated the distress after 1930. British
policy played a key role. The government was disinclined to create
80 Straits Settlements Police, SSADR 1930, p 501; SSADR 1931, p 433.
81 Straits Settlements Police, SSADR 1934, p 194.
82 Straits Settlements Police, SSADR 1931, p 429.
83 See Ban Kah Choon (2001), Absent History: The Untold Story of Special Branch
Operations in Singapore 1915–1942, Raffles, Singapore, pp 119–166.
84 MRCA December 1930, pp 56–57.
85 Straits Settlements Police, SSADR 1933, p 502.
86 Yeo Kim Wah (1976), ‘Communist involvement in the Malayan labour strikes: 1936’,
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol 49, No 2, pp 44–45.
87 MRCA March 1934, p 32.
88 MRCA October 1934, p 57.
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jobs through large-scale public work and was adamant that ‘under no
circumstances will the Government make contributions for the
purposes of doles’.89 The regime’s response instead was immigration
restriction and mass emigration, reversing the long-standing policy of
free and open immigration. This, for a small territory like Singapore,
was akin to the effects of the departure of urban dwellers to the
countryside. Gregg Huff argued that ‘only mass emigration prevented
the depression from turning into a disaster’.90 In August 1930, the
British limited the number of adult Indian and Chinese male arrivals to
the Straits Settlements to 5,238 (less than half the figure for 1929), a
number slashed repeatedly to 1,000 in June 1932. Between 1930 and
1933, the quotas reduced the number of Chinese immigrants arriving
in Singapore from 242,149 to under 28,000. They were revised
upwards in May 1933 with the recovery of the economy and the
demand for labour. The British also repatriated all unemployed Indian
labourers and destitute and decrepit Chinese from Malaya, although
not the numerous unemployed able-bodied Chinese labourers, except
on two occasions, between August and November 1931 and May and
July 1932, when Chinese unemployment was particularly severe.
The immigration policy alleviated the unemployment crisis by
removing many jobless Chinese and Indians and improving the quality
of arrivals. Victor Purcell, the Immigration Officer of the Federated
Malay States and Straits Settlements, noticed that only traders and shop
assistants could afford the increased prices of passage fares charged by
the shipping companies.91 By the end of 1930, new Chinese arrivals
were generally better skilled.92 Similarly, repatriation targeted ‘mining
and agricultural labour’, particularly ‘the older and less fit members of
the labouring class’.93 By 1934, it appeared that ‘the unemployed is
more likely to be the unemployable, the broken down coolie or rick-
shaw puller who is past regular work, than the able bodied and intelligent
labourer required for industrial purposes’.94 However, the immigration
policy was by itself inadequate: it targeted mainly male labourers and
did not cover most able-bodied Chinese, the white-collar class and
locally born, particularly the Straits Chinese, Eurasians and Malays, or
89 SSLCP 1931, p B134.
90 Huff, supra note 4, at p 313.
91 Victor Purcell (1965), The Memoirs of a Malayan Official, Cassell, London, p 222.
92 SSLCP 1931, p B7.
93 Medical Department, SSADR 1934, p 995.
94 SSTC 1933–1934, Vol 1, p 152.
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women and children. People who remained in Singapore still had to
eke out a living.
For them, the other societal factor was the Depression’s beneficial
effect in reducing the prices of imported foodstuffs and other consumer
goods on which Singapore was reliant. In the 1920s, buoyed by a boom-
ing economy, the high cost of living, or ‘HCL’ was a frequent complaint
in the newspapers. Table 8 shows the slump causing a modest fall, after
a time lag, in the cost of living in 1930 and a larger one between 1931
and 1933, particularly for the Asian standard of living. Between 1929
and 1933 (see Table 9), the prices of food and groceries fell by 47%,
rent by 44%, clothing by 24%, and tobacco by 23%. These items
totalled 64% of overall expenditure, or more if food took up a larger
proportion of the expenses – Gregg Huff has suggested 72%, as
opposed to 46% in the British records.95 The price of Siamese rice, the
chief Asian staple, fell from 52 cents per gantang (gallon) in 1929 to
25 cents in 1933. Ng Lee Kar, a shop proprietor, remembered that
rubber tappers with reduced incomes could support their families
because of the low price of rice, and also by buying cheaper, locally
grown vegetables, or growing their own.96 Rents were high in 1930,
with landlords criticized for being ignorant of market conditions,97 or
preferring to keep their houses vacant.98 However, by 1931, many land-
lords had reduced rents by 20% or more, with those in the outlying
areas of the town making the greatest reductions, or allowing tenants
to pay by instalment.99 The price falls for other items between 1929
and 1932 were smaller – about 2% for light and water (with a larger
fall in 1933), 5% for transport and 14% for education. But with the
exception of water, these items were strictly speaking non-essentials,
and people could economize on them or substitute them with others.
Real wages (see Table 10) can be calculated by weighing the wage
index of Indian labourers (Table 11) against the Asian cost of living
index. Labourers in the municipality and manufacturing who retained
employment benefited from the lowered cost of living: their real wages
were stable in 1930 and rose considerably thereafter. Those who
suffered were the smaller numbers working on rubber estates and
95 Huff, supra note 4, at p 304. Huff bases his estimation on the Dutch East Indies’ cost
of living index.
96 Ng Lee Kar, OHI, 16/03/1982, p 311.
97 MT, 17/12/1930, p 4.
98 MT, 13/05/1931, p 11.
99 Assessment & Estates Department, SMAR 1930, p 2-A.
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Table 8. Cost of living index in Singapore, 1929–35 (1929 = 100).
Standard 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Asian 100 94.8 80.3 69.8 63.8 66.3 69.5
Eurasian 100 94.7 84.2 74.9 70.0 71.9 72.2
European 100 96.5 90.2 83.3 79.0 80.2 80.4
Source: Labour Wages & Cost of Living, Straits Settlements Blue Book (SSBB),
1929–1935.
Table 9. Cost of living index in Singapore by item, 1929–35 (Asian standard of
living, 1929 = 100).
Item Weight 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
(1914)
Food & groceries 46 100 93.7 68.8 57.8 52.6 55.7 62.7
Servants 11 100 98.3 88.7 80.2 74.5 79.6 81.9
Transport 11 100 95.3 107.2 99.2 95.2 94.2 91.9
Education 9 100 97.8 89.7 86.1 84.5 89.2 91.6
Rent 9 100 92.1 78.7 63.7 55.8 55.8 55.8
Clothing 8 100 99.1 94.5 78.0 75.8 70.6 70.7
Light & water 4 100 97.8 97.8 97.8 75.4 93.9 93.9
Tobacco 2 100 92.3 92.3 89.2 77.0 77.0 69.3
Total weight 100
Source: compiled from Labour Wages & Cost of Living, SSBB, 1929–1935.
Table 10. Wage index of male Indian labourers in Singapore, 1929–35 (1929 =
100).
Type 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Municipal 100 100 91.4 78.6 137.1 137.1 135.7
Estate 100 76.9 61.5 61.5 61.5 84.6 61.5
Rubber factory 100 75.0 75.0 68.8 68.8 68.8 68.8
Manufacturing 100 100 94.4 88.9 88.9 88.9 120.0
Source: compiled from Labour Wages & Cost of Living, SSBB, 1929–1935.
Table 11. Real wages index for male Indian labourers in Singapore, 1929–35
(1929 = 100).
Type 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935
Municipal 100 105.5 113.8 112.6 214.9 206.8 195.3
Estate 100 81.1 76.6 88.1 96.4 127.6 88.5
Rubber factory 100 79.1 93.4 98.6 107.8 103.8 99.0
Manufacturing 100 105.5 117.6 127.4 139.3 134.1 172.7
Note: real wage index = wage index/Asian cost of living index.
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factories. Since the wages of other labourers were based on those of
Indian estate workers, a similar experience may be true for other ethnic
and employment groups. Soh Wah Seng, who retained his job at the
SIT, remembered luxury items such as leather shoes from England,
suits and silk socks being remarkably cheap.100 Still the reduced cost of
living did not bring relief to all. The real wages index does not cover
the unemployed or take into account the reduction in actual work done
because of the rotation of work.
Having cordial relations and the right contacts
To comprehend fully how people avoided the worst effects of the
Depression, one must understand their responses at the individual level.
The slump nurtured a strong spirit of self-help and resilience and inno-
vation amid adversity. Coffee-shop owners enticed customers by placing
bowls of sugar on tables,101 while competing barbers slashed their rates
from 40 cents to 5 cents, or even gave away free soap.102 For other
businessmen, the Depression was an opportunity as well as a crisis.
Yeo Tiam Siew, who compiled the first Chinese telephone directory
just before the Wall Street crash, made a $3,000 profit from the first
issue, and by 1933 was making nearly $4,000 yearly. His directory was
popular with most Chinese who could not read English.103 Similarly,
Lien Ying Chow’s modest Wah Hin & Company, which supplied food-
stuffs to the British forces and small shops, fared well because his ‘prices
were always competitive’ and he ‘always gave them good service, and
they liked to give contracts to the people they knew’.104 The best
example is Aw Boon Haw, maker of the traditional Chinese analgesic,
Tiger Balm. Aw profited during the slump by increasing the supply of
Tiger Balm to South East Asia and China. Aw had an uncanny business
sense:
Rich or poor, people get sick and sick people need medicine. The poor cannot
afford to see a doctor or even a sinseh [Chinese physician]. But they can afford
a few cents to buy our medicines. We will keep our prices low. Our suppliers
100 Soh Wah Seng, OHI.
101 Ibid, OHI.
102 Liaw Ching Sing, OHI, 28/07/1981.
103 Yeo Tiam Siew (1993), Destined to Survive: The Story of My Life, Yeo Tiam Siew,
Singapore, pp 70–73.
104 Lien Ying Chow (1992), From Chinese Villager to Singapore Tycoon: My Life Story,
Times Books International, Singapore, p 68.
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need money. They will sell cheap, even cheaper than previously. So you see,
my brother, we can afford to maintain low prices and sell to make a bigger
profit.105
Many people, including white-collar workers, were willing to take on
jobs in the local economy ‘considered de classe in happier times’.106
Hawking was one such occupation. In 1931, there were some 6,000
licensed and 10,000 unlicensed hawkers, among whom ‘at least half of
the Hokkien hawkers [the most numerous group] are potential vagrants,
either because of slump conditions or that they have previously
followed trades which by reason of age or infirmity they can no longer
continue’, and ‘[e]very Cantonese thrown out of employment can be
regarded a potential hawker’.107 The itinerants included Chinese women
from the building industry who had turned to planting vegetables. These
peddlers, not truly hawkers, had ventured into informal work, typi-
cally in agriculture or artisan work, due to unemployment.108 Hawkers
endured a difficult year in 1930 due to a police campaign started in
1927 to arrest unlicensed hawkers. The authorities’ refusal to grant
hawking licences to unemployed able-bodied men and cripples exacer-
bated the problem.109 In 1930, the public witnessed frequent scenes of
hawkers being roughly handled and dragged to the police station to be
charged with unlicensed hawking or street indiscipline. Likely fines of
$2–$5 for hawking without a licence, or $4–$8 for hawking in a pro-
hibited area,110 were heavy penalties, for ‘[h]ow could a man only capable
of earning about 80 cents per day afford to pay a fine of $10 or more?’111
Worse was the destruction of their goods, usually obtained on credit.
Asian unofficials in the Legislative Council warned the government
that the occupation provided ‘employment to a certain class of
indigent people who otherwise would have to starve or live by crime’
and that ‘[t]his avenue of employment should certainly not be
completely closed to the poor’.112 In late 1931, the government ceased
105 King, S. (1992), Tiger Balm King: The Life & Times of Aw Boon Haw, Times Books
International, Singapore, p 265.
106 MT, 13/07/1932, p 3.
107
‘Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Hawker Question in Singa-
pore’, SSLCP 1931, p C27.
108 Ibid, p C73.
109 Yeo Lian Bee, supra note 73, at pp 118–120.
110 Ibid, p 138.
111 MT, 18/08/1930, p 7.
112 SSLCP 1930, pp B7–8.
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its campaign against hawkers and made licences available for
itinerants, which brought some relief.113
People also turned to farming and other informal work in the local
economy. Chinese market gardeners grew vegetables, which supplied
much of the town’s needs, and reared pigs, poultry and carp.114 Locally
grown vegetables competed well against imports, with about 12 tons
produced daily and the acreage rising to 3,000 acres in 1933, due partly
to Chinese squatters using rubber land for vegetable-growing.115
Educated persons found other work such as giving private tuition. When
Chua Boon Hean, who painted cinema posters, suffered a large pay cut
on joining another firm, he compensated by giving tuition in Chinese.116
Tay Meng Hock, despite his accounting degree, was unable to find an
accounting or managerial job for nearly a year. To support his
widowed mother and family, he laboured as a cutter in a pineapple
factory, and when work ceased because of the slump, a friend recom-
mended him to work as a gate collector for weekly football matches at
the Anson Road stadium, where he earned 50–70 cents daily. Six months
later, through another friend, Tay was hired by the American Life
Insurance Company.117
The positive responses of individuals also resulted in mutual assist-
ance within their social circles, among family members, friends and
kinsmen. Where kinship ties had been important in better times in helping
the Chinese do business and find employment, in an economic crisis
they were vital. Mutual help was less effective at the institutional level,
as contributions to voluntary organizations were reduced by failures of
businesses and widespread retrenchment. In August 1932, the Legisla-
tive Council was warned that such ‘private efforts which have been
made to deal with it [unemployment] have not met with a great
measure of success’.118
Mutual help was much more effective among individuals or
individual entities. Many struggling businesses decided to cooperate
or amalgamate. The best known of these were the three Hokkien banks,
Chinese Commercial, Ho Hong and Oversea Chinese, which faced cash-
flow difficulties due to unsecured loans made to businessmen such as
113 SMAR 1932, p 13–I.
114 SSAR 1931, Vol 9, p 23.
115 SSAR 1932, Vol 10, p 19; SSAR 1933, Vol 10, p 20; SSAR 1934, Vol 10, p 23.
116 Chua Boon Hean, OHI, 25/07/1990.
117 Tay Meng Hock, OHI.
118 SSLCP 1932, p B90.
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Tan Kah Kee. To reduce overheads, pool resources and combine their
assets, the banks amalgamated into Oversea Chinese Banking
Corporation (OCBC) in October 1932. The move proved to be a
turning point for Chinese banking in South East Asia, where banks
that survived the slump would restructure along more modern
principles of banking.119 The OCBC did so by recruiting a corps of
‘pioneer bank officials’, including ‘compradores, chief clerks,
cashiers, accountants, sub-accountants or officers of the European banks
or trading firms’.120 Newly appointed directors such as Lee Kong Chian
and Tan Chin Tuan were familiar with Western business practices and
did away with the policy of preferentially making unsecured loans to
clansmen.121 They saw the lesson of the slump as the ‘need for liquidity
and financial management’,122 and made efforts to keep at least half the
bank’s assets liquid as part of a ‘safety first’ policy.123 After a hesitant
start, the OCBC expanded when the slump receded, which has since
been seen as a ‘blessing in disguise’ for the bank.124
A mix of entrepreneurship and business and family ties was respon-
sible for the success of Lee Kong Chian, who expanded his modest
rubber company by buying rubber plantations at rock-bottom prices.125
Lim Nee Soon, a businessman who had invested heavily in rubber, was
saddled with bank debts during the slump. After Lee helped negotiate
a settlement with his creditor, Lim leased his rubber factory to Lee in
return. Tan Kah Kee, Lee’s father-in-law, also leased his rubber and
pineapple assets and biscuit factory to Lee when his company was
liquidated.126 Nonetheless, Lee’s success was due to his business
philosophy as much as to his patrons. Unlike the older business
generation, Lee did not speculate in rubber, and traded immediately
what he imported, a conservative but safe policy in a time of falling
rubber prices.127 He also took care to repay his long-term loans.128 Later
119 Brown, R. A. (1994), Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia, Macmillan
Press, Basingstoke, pp 170–172.
120 Yap, supra note 12, at pp 35–36.
121 Melanie Chew (1996), Leaders of Singapore, Resource Press, Singapore, p 218.
122 Yap, supra note 12, at p 38.
123 Grace Loh, Goh Chor Boon and Tan Teng Lang (2000), Building Bridges, Carving
Niches: An Enduring Legacy, Oxford University Press, Singapore, p 27.
124 Yap, supra note 12, at p 31.
125 Lee Seng Gee, OHI, 20/98/1980, pp 15–16.
126 Tan Kok Kheng, OHI, 14/12/1982, p 25.
127 Lee Seng Gee, OHI, pp 11–13.
128 Brown, supra note 119, at pp 112–113.
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known as the ‘Rubber and Pineapple King’, Lee mused, ‘Opportuni-
ties will fall in the way of every man but not every man will use them’.129
Help from family members, kinsmen and friends was a crucial source
of financial and emotional support in the difficult times. An examina-
tion of the coroner’s inquests reveals the despair occasioned by the
absence of such support. The strain of supporting a large family with
young dependants can be seen in the case of Ong Kok, a respected
village headman and a kind family man, who borrowed $7,000 from a
chettiar (Indian moneylender) to buy a rubber plantation in June 1930.
As rubber prices plummeted, his partner recalled, ‘[a]bout a week
before his death . . . he appeared to be worrying considerably about his
debt, he seemed very down-hearted’. One night in September, Ong killed
his wife, his 11-year-old son and four daughters, aged five months, and
five, 10 and 14 years, before slitting his own throat. His 12-year-old
son and a seven-year-old daughter survived.130 The suicides of Ong
Chui Seng and Tan Yok Hoe, who had two young children aged five
and eight years, show the anguish of lacking support from one’s kin.
Ong, unemployed for several years and often berated by his father about
it, took caustic soda together with his wife. In his suicide note, Ong
wrote, ‘We are surrounded by starvation and coldness....When my boy
has grown up, he must remember the kindness of his parents and repay
them for it’. He survived, but she did not.131
As opposed to support not forthcoming from one’s kin, individuals
also became suicidal when they kept their torment to themselves, as
shown in cases in which the family and friends of the deceased were
ignorant of the reasons for the suicide. Narain Singh, for instance, was
a watchman who also loaned money, but talked little about his prob-
lems to his family. When he cut his throat in October 1933, it was from
the promissory notes and bankruptcy documents in his room that his
family found the cause of his suicide: his debtors had gone bankrupt,
and he himself was $156 in debt, a large sum in those times.132 Another
group with little local support, sinkehs like Yap Chow Yen, also found
life daunting. Yap, whose provisions shop had failed in Deli, Sumatra,
came to Singapore alone before 1931 with a sleeping mat, a change of
129 Chew, supra note 121, at p 27.
130 Ong Kok (1930), Singapore Coroner’s Inquests and Inquiries (hereafter SCII), No
489/1930, 12/09/1930 (Subordinate Courts of Singapore), pp 18–41. The coroners’
inquests used in this paper are from the Subordinate Courts.
131 Tan Yok Hoe, SCII, No 419/1934, 01/10/1934, pp 9–25.
132 Narain Singh, SCII, No 522/1933, 19/10/1933, pp 6–13.
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clothes and very little money, having spent most of it on the passage.
Unable to find work, Yap wrote tearfully to his son in Deli, asking him
to bring money quickly to Singapore. The son did not come, and Yap
hanged himself. His tragedy also highlights the (in this case) devastat-
ing importance of immigration restriction.133
When mutual help was present, its impact was positive. Natesan
Palanivelu, who applied to numerous companies for six months with-
out success, finally obtained a job as a ticketing clerk with the Singapore
Traction Company through a friend who worked there, after which ‘life
is very easy’.134 Likewise, S. C. Somasundram, who had only just come
to Singapore, felt like ‘a parasite’ when he was unable to find work.
Fortunately, his relations ‘were very cordial. I was always a bit
worried because I was unemployed. My food, clothing and everything
is given by my brother or my cousins or my uncles and others’.135 When
the nuclear family had young people of working age, it was an
important bulwark against destitution. Many youths were saddled with
the responsibility of supporting the family and sometimes had to leave
school to work in the local economy. This was often a difficult but
formative experience when they grew up emotionally and socially. Often
more concerned about fulfilling obligations to the family, they recon-
ciled themselves to the loss of educational opportunity. T.C. Koh, who
had to abandon his ambition to enter Raffles College when his father’s
business failed, ‘could not bear the idea of depending on him for my
education when I knew that the family’s financial resources were alarm-
ingly low’. He began working in 1933 with ‘fear and trembling...facing
a challenge not of my seeking’, as a clerk with the Land Office, a 17-
year-old in charge of a team of five men, handling the issue of rubber
coupons worth millions of dollars.136
Women also became more assertive and important members of the
family. The restriction of male immigration helped change women’s
status ‘from a dependent to an independent one, from recipients of to
contributors to family welfare’.137 With men thrown out of work, many
mothers, wives or daughters became the family’s main or sole bread-
133 Yap Chow Yen, SCII, No 47/1931, 21/01/1931, pp 3–18.
134 Natesan Palanivelu, OHI, 02/08/1985, pp 64–67.
135 Somasundram, S. C., OHI, 15/03/1982, pp 134–135.
136 Koh, T. C. (1993), Memories of a Golden Era: Autobiography of T. C. Koh, Singa-
pore Methodist Church, Singapore, pp 16–17.
137 Chiang, C. (1994), ‘Female migrants in Singapore: towards a strategy of pragmatism
and coping’, in Jaschok, M., and Miers, S., eds, Women and Chinese Patriarchy:
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winners.138 Some worked as ‘sly prostitutes’ (brothels had been out-
lawed in 1927); many waitresses and cashiers in restaurants and
coffee-shops were in fact prostitutes. Most women worked in other
trades: they were saleswomen working in shops and female barbers
‘commanding fair wages’ in Malaya and Singapore.139 Others sewed,
mended clothes, washed laundry, did domestic work, and worked in
factories. When Gerald de Cruz’s unemployed father refused to accept
a lower-paying job, his mother, a teacher, took on a second teaching
job, making $90 a month and providing for a family of eight, including
four children. According to de Cruz, his mother was a ‘raft’ to which
his father clung.140 Another strong lady was the mother of Lee Khoon
Choy and 14 other children. When Lee’s father, a coolie kepala (head-
man) died in 1932, ‘[g]one were the “good friends” and “relatives”
who had frequented our home in pursuit of good food, good wine and
Father’s favours’. His mother sold sarongs and jewellery and later
became a mistress of ceremony for Peranakan weddings. Lee observed:
My widowed mother took her circumstances in her stride and displayed an
enterprising side to her character which had lain dormant throughout her
severely sheltered existence as a wife. She had never stepped out of the house
during Father’s lifetime.141
Bonds within the nuclear family were frequently resilient. Victor Seah’s
father, who had to provide for four girls and a boy, lost his business
during the slump. He sold his youngest daughter but took her back at
the eldest daughter’s insistence. In March 1932, when Victor was born,
[t]he joyful birth was celebrated in the midst of poverty. Times were really bad.
The Depression was at its peak. Nonetheless, the proud mother had the best
nourishment available, steamed chicken soup from the last bird in the backyard.142
Conclusion
Life in Singapore during the Depression was considerably varied,
depending on where people stood in relation to the international
economy, their profession, gender, age and health, and their ties with
138 MT, 29/06/1932, p 7.
139 The China Critic, 26/07/1934, cited in MRCA August 1934, p 70.
140 de Cruz, G. (1993), Rojak Rebel: Memoirs of a Singapore Maverick, Times Books
International, Singapore, pp 12–13, 68–71.
141 Lee Khoon Choy (1988), On the Beat to the Hustings: An Autobiography, Times
Books International, Singapore, pp 5–6.
142 Seah Tiong Hin, supra note 42, at pp 10–12.
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family, kin and friends. The year 1930 was the grimmest , after which
immigration controls prevented overcrowding, and the falling cost of
living brought relief to those who remained in work. Estate workers,
clerks and labourers in the international economy suffered more than
those in the local economy, such as government employees. For people
with stable employment, the early 1930s were plentiful years amid the
low cost of living, although they were a minority. Those who took up
non-salaried work in the local economy, such as hawking, farming or
tutoring, could get by if they could survive the increased competition.
At the individual level, self-reliance, mutual help and family bonds
helped people find work or obtain living expenses, food and lodging
from family members, kinsmen and friends. The slump was difficult
for large families with young and old dependants, while life was also
painful for sinkehs with few local contacts and lone elderly persons,
but their numbers were small due to emigration. More established
families with members of working age could usually make ends meet.
Although Singapore’s population had no land entitlements, mutual help
and family bonds were arguably a form of social security that enabled
people to grapple with unemployment collectively, and provided
assistance not forthcoming from government and social institutions.
These responses were rooted in Singapore’s long history of mutual help
and its evolution to a settled society during the late colonial period.
The colonial government believed that people ‘simply had to tighten
up their belts’ during the Depression.143 An understanding of life at the
individual level shows they did much more than that.
143 Health Department, SMAR 1932, p 38-D.
